Russia’s New Spy Problem. When Recklessness Becomes a Strategy

For decades, Russian intelligence cultivated a reputation built on patience, discipline and secrecy. The Cold War spy was a master of the shadows: careful, methodical and nearly invisible. Today, according to former CIA station chief Sean Wiswesser, something has changed. Russian operatives are taking bigger risks, conducting more aggressive operations, and in some cases acting with what he describes as an unprecedented level of recklessness.
That should concern everyone.
The biggest misconception about espionage is that it belongs to history. People imagine grainy photographs, secret codes, dead drops in forests and men in trench coats exchanging envelopes. While some traditional tradecraft remains surprisingly unchanged, modern espionage has expanded far beyond the spy novel. Russia’s intelligence services now operate in a world where cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage operations and influence networks are often more powerful than a stolen document.
The result is a form of conflict that exists permanently below the threshold of war.
Wiswesser argues that Western democracies are failing to appreciate the scale of this challenge. His warning is blunt: democratic societies remain "wilfully unprepared" for the reality of modern Russian hybrid warfare. From cyber operations to alleged sabotage attempts, the threat is no longer theoretical. It is continuous, adaptive and increasingly difficult to attribute.
That ambiguity is precisely the point.
The genius of hybrid warfare is that it exploits uncertainty. If a cyberattack cripples infrastructure, who is responsible? If a drone appears over a sensitive site, is it espionage, provocation or coincidence? If a fire breaks out under suspicious circumstances, is it criminal activity or state-sponsored sabotage? By operating in the grey zone between peace and conflict, intelligence services can create disruption without triggering a conventional response.
Even more troubling is the increasing use of proxies.
Rather than deploying elite intelligence officers, modern operations may use intermediaries who have little understanding of the wider mission. This creates distance between the sponsoring state and the action itself. For investigators, proving responsibility becomes harder. For governments, responding becomes politically more complicated.
Yet there is another side to the story.
For all the fear generated by Russian intelligence capabilities, Wiswesser emphasizes that these organizations are not invincible. They make mistakes. They suffer from bureaucracy, corruption and internal frustrations. According to his assessment, there may never have been a better opportunity to recruit intelligence sources from inside Russia than during the current period of geopolitical tension.
That observation challenges one of the most persistent myths in international security: that authoritarian systems are inherently more effective. They are often more secretive, but secrecy can conceal weakness as easily as strength.
The lesson for the West is clear. The greatest danger is not that Russia has suddenly become unstoppable. The greater danger is complacency.
Traditional national security thinking focuses on tanks, fighter jets and military budgets. Hybrid warfare demands a different mindset. It requires protecting digital infrastructure, identifying influence operations, strengthening intelligence cooperation and developing resilience against disruption. Most importantly, it requires recognizing that modern espionage is no longer a niche concern for security professionals. It is a defining feature of contemporary geopolitics.
The world’s intelligence battlefield has expanded from hidden meeting points and secret communications to social media feeds, power grids, undersea cables and cyberspace. The question is no longer whether intelligence competition is intensifying.
The question is whether democracies can adapt before their adversaries exploit the gap.





