For decades, space policy in Germany was discussed in terms of science, exploration, and civil applications. That era is over.

Today, space has become a core military domain—and Germany is finally investing accordingly. The Bundeswehr’s planned multi‑billion‑euro investments in space capabilities mark a historic shift. But according to Matthias Wachter, head of the NewSpace Initiative and co‑director for Innovation, Security, and Technology at the BDI, the real strategic question is not how much Germany spends—but how.

Modern armed forces depend fundamentally on space. Satellites provide secure communications, navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning. Without them, large parts of today’s military operations would simply collapse. As autonomous systems proliferate on the battlefield, dependence on orbital infrastructure will only intensify.

This is no longer theory.

The war in Ukraine has turned space into a visible factor of battlefield resilience. Satellite communications have allowed Ukrainian leadership to maintain command and control under sustained attack. Systems such as Starlink have not only stabilized communications but enabled drone operations and unit coordination in real time. At the same time, commercial Earth‑observation satellites have delivered high‑resolution imagery used for situational awareness and target identification.

Two realities emerge from that experience.

First, access to space is now a prerequisite for military effectiveness. Second, that access is no longer provided solely by states. Commercial providers have become strategic actors—sometimes faster, more adaptable, and more resilient than traditional government systems.

This is where Wachter’s warning becomes pointed.

Germany’s impending investments open a historic window of opportunity. They can either reinforce dependence on foreign suppliers and isolated prime contractors—or build a resilient national and European space ecosystem that integrates startups, SMEs, industry, and defense users into a shared capability base.

The risk is not abstract. Europe has already experienced what happens when access to space is outsourced. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European dependence on Russian launch services collapsed overnight. Temporary loss of sovereign access to space became a wake‑up call across the continent.

Wachter argues that space policy must now be treated as industrial strategy as much as defense procurement. Procuring satellites without growing domestic launch, data, software, and service capabilities risks hollowing out long‑term sovereignty. Money spent without ecosystem thinking can flow abroad—along with strategic leverage.

The solution is not less military ambition. It is broader ambition.

Space investments should deliberately strengthen dual‑use technologies, accelerate innovation cycles, and enable commercial providers to scale alongside military demand. Startups and SMEs matter as much as prime contractors, not as subcontractors, but as innovation drivers able to deliver speed and adaptability—qualities increasingly decisive in space and security competition.

This requires institutional change as well. Fragmented responsibilities within the Bundeswehr, split between different commands, create inefficiencies in a domain where integration is essential. Space capabilities cannot be managed in silos while adversaries treat orbit as an operational continuum with cyber, electronic warfare, and terrestrial forces.

The lesson from Ukraine is uncomfortable but clear.

Space dominance is not achieved by hardware alone. It emerges from ecosystems that can adapt under pressure, absorb losses, and regenerate capability faster than opponents. Commercial resilience, rapid iteration, and industrial depth matter as much as classified systems.

Germany’s space billions, then, are about more than defense budgets.

They will decide whether Europe becomes a strategic space power by design—or by dependence.

And that decision is being made now.

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