Europe has spent years debating strategic autonomy. France and Germany now want to turn one of its most important parts into software.

The two countries have pledged to examine the development of a sovereign European digital backbone that could reduce dependence on military and intelligence platforms supplied by U.S. companies such as Palantir.

The proposed system would bring together secure data infrastructure, artificial intelligence, cloud services and military command-and-control tools developed in Europe.

The political message is clear: Europe does not want its most sensitive defence data, operational planning and intelligence systems to depend permanently on technology controlled outside the continent.

But the technical challenge is enormous.

Palantir has established a strong position in defence, intelligence and government data analysis. Its platforms are used to combine information from many sources, support operational decisions and create a shared picture of complex situations.

NATO also uses Palantir technology, and a senior alliance commander recently argued that Europe did not yet have a true alternative.

France disagrees—or at least wants to prove that an alternative can be built.

The French armed forces have promoted Arcadia, an AI-supported military command-and-control platform, as a possible European answer to Palantir’s Maven software. Germany, meanwhile, has already shown interest in European suppliers, with its intelligence service selecting French company ChapsVision rather than Palantir.

The new Franco-German declaration goes beyond choosing a different software vendor.

It suggests building a broader digital foundation for European defence.

Such a backbone could connect military sensors, intelligence databases, cloud platforms, command centres, aircraft, drones, satellites and ground systems. In theory, it would allow European forces to collect, process and share data without relying heavily on American infrastructure.

That is becoming increasingly important as modern warfare moves toward software-defined operations.

A tank, fighter jet or missile is no longer effective as an isolated platform. Its value depends on how quickly it can receive information, share targeting data and coordinate with other systems.

France and Germany also announced plans for a European collaborative combat standard. The idea is to ensure that fighter aircraft, combat drones and other systems developed by different European countries can communicate and operate together.

This could be more important than any single weapons project.

Europe has many national defence companies and military platforms, but they often use different systems, standards and data architectures. Without interoperability, even advanced equipment can struggle to function as part of a unified force.

The same logic applies to the Main Ground Combat System, or MGCS.

France and Germany plan to begin research into autonomous driving, sensors and battlefield networking for the future system intended to replace the Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks. The initial goal is a proof of concept rather than a finished vehicle.

This shows how the centre of military capability is shifting.

The future tank may matter less as a single armoured machine and more as part of a network that includes crewed vehicles, autonomous platforms, drones, sensors and long-range weapons.

France, Germany and Britain are also considering cooperation on missiles with ranges of up to 2,500 kilometres. At the same time, Paris and Berlin want closer cooperation on reconnaissance satellites and greater use of European launch systems such as Ariane 6.

Taken together, these initiatives point toward a larger ambition: building an independent European chain from space-based surveillance to battlefield data, command software and long-range strike.

However, political declarations do not automatically become operational systems.

France and Germany have a history of ambitious defence projects that move slowly because of disagreements over leadership, industrial workshare, export policy and technical requirements.

The troubled FCAS fighter project is a reminder of that risk. Notably, it was absent from the latest declaration.

A European alternative to Palantir will also require more than national pride.

It must be secure, fast, scalable and easy for military personnel to use. It must combine classified information from many countries while respecting national controls. Most importantly, it must work during a real crisis, not only during presentations and trials.

Europe’s problem is no longer a lack of awareness.

Its leaders understand that software, data and artificial intelligence are becoming as strategically important as missiles, tanks and aircraft.

The real question is whether Europe can build and deploy a sovereign digital backbone before the next major security crisis forces it to rely once again on technology from abroad.

France and Germany have announced the ambition.

Now they must prove Europe can code as strategically as it talks.

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